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The recent financial crisis in East Asia, across countries with very different institutional
characteristics, allows the identification of factors that determine the use of bankruptcy as
a means of resolving corporate distress.  Using a sample of 4,569 publicly traded East
Asian firms, we observe a total of 106 bankruptcies in 1997 and 1998.  We find that the
likelihood  of  filing  is  lower  for  firms  with  ownership  links  to  banks  and  families,
controlling for firm and country characteristics.  In addition, filings are more likely  in
countries  with  better judicial  systems.  Finally, we  find  that  the  interaction  between
strong creditor rights and a better judicial system increases the likelihood of bankruptcy.
JEL Classification Codes: G33, G34.
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Both country and firm characteristics affect the way that financial institutions and
commercial creditors confront financial distress. Country differences include variations in
legal  systems,  accounting standards, and regulatory  frameworks, while firms  differ in
their capital and ownership structures.  In this paper, we address an answered question in
the literature of the effect of firm and country characteristics on the likelihood that a firm
in financial distress uses formal bankruptcy procedures as a means of resolving corporate
distress.
The widespread  financial  crisis  in  East  Asia  caused  large  economic  shocks,
varying by degree, across the region.  This provides a unique opportunity to investigate
the factors determining the use of bankruptcy processes in a number of countries.  The
East Asian countries that we  study - Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand - differ in their institutional  frameworks
for resolving financial distress, arising in part from the different origins of their judicial
systems.  One particular difference is the strength of creditor rights, which we document
by updating the indices calculated by La Porta et al. (1997).1 The strength of a creditor to
collect payment  in the  case of default  may influence the  decision whether to  settle  a
default in or out of court.  We expect, therefore, that differences in legal enforcement and
judicial efficiency should affect the resolution of financial distress.
Although banks play a critical role in financial intermediation in most East Asian
countries,  the  degree  of  ownership  of  corporations  by  financial  institutions  varies
considerably from country to country.  For example, the percentage of firms with bank
2ownership  is  large  in  Japan  and  the Philippines  and  relatively  small  in  Taiwan.  In
addition, there is regional variation in the concentration of ownership of corporations by
families, that  may provide preferential  supplier credit  and  purchasing.  For example,
family  ownership  plays  an  important  role  in  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  and  Thailand.
Corporate ownership is an important factor in the resolution of financial distress, since
bank- and family-related firms may have access to preferential sources of external credit.
The  differences  in  corporate  governance  among  countries  and  firms  may  affect  the
relationship  between firms and their creditors that influences the timing,  severity, and
resolution of financial distress.
For a sample of 4,569 publicly traded East Asian firms, we observe a total of 106
bankruptcies during  1997 and  1998.  We find that the likelihood of filing is negatively
associated  with  bank  and  family  ownership,  controlling  for  firm-specific  financial
measures, such as leverage and (pseudo-) Tobin's  Q.  The importance of bank and family
connections  suggests  that  informational  advantages  and  non-market  based  resource
allocations  encourage  out-of-court  renegotiations  and  delay  the  use  of  formal
reorganizations procedures.
We also  show the importance of judicial  efficiency:  Filings are more likely  in
countries with strong judicial  systems and creditor rights.  In addition, we find that the
interaction  between  strong  creditor  rights  and  a  better judicial  system  increases  the
likelihood  of  filing.  This  suggests that  a  creditor will  only  force a  firm to  file  for
bankruptcy and incur the related legal costs if ex-ante loan features and ex-post judicial
efficacy indicate an adequate chance of recovery of losses.
l  Within  our  sample  of  countries,  the  legal  systems  in Japan,  Korea  and  Taiwan  are  of  Germanic  origin;
Malaysia,  Hong Kong, Singapore  and Thailand  are of Anglo-Saxon  origin; Indonesia  and the Philippines
3The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on corporate
financial  distress  and  its  relationship  with  creditor  protection  under  different  legal
systems.  Section 3 describes our data and summary statistics for the region.  Section 4
presents our empirical results and a discussion of our findings.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  The Literature
In previous literature, we find comparisons between the bankruptcy  systems in
developed countries.  These studies discuss the effects of different regimes on the ex-ante
behavior of firms and on the ex-post efficiency of resolution.  In particular, these papers
focus on the relative advantages of debtor- and creditor-friendly regimes.  For example,
debtor-friendly  regimes,  such  as  the  US  bankruptcy  law,  allow  current  managers,
appointed  by  the  firm's  equity  holders,  to  continue  managing  the  firm  during
reorganization negotiations.  Creditor-friendly regimes, such as the UK bankruptcy law,
give creditors the power to replace existing managers.
White (1993) and Kaiser (1994) argue that in creditor-friendly regimes, the threat
of being fired gives managers strong ex-ante incentive to engage in less risky activities.
However,  since  a  new manager  may be  unfamiliar  with  the  company and  unable  to
ensure a smooth transition, the creditor suffers higher costs of resolution during distress.
They suggest that although a debtor-friendly regime may allow incompetent managers to
keep their jobs,  the creditor has ex-post financial benefits.  In addition, debtor-friendly
laws encourage managers to seek bankruptcy protection from their creditors, which may
allow the firm to survive and ultimately benefit claimants.  Yet, it is not obvious which
are of French-origin.
4regime  is most  cost-efficient and  these studies do not establish how the likelihood of
bankruptcy filings varies across legal systems.
Related literature suggests that differences between countries concerning creditor
rights and judicial  efficacy should affect the use of courts to resolve financial distress.
Harris and Raviv (1992) argue that bankruptcy law and enforceability are determinants of
the  variation  in  debt  contracts  features.  They  show  that judicial  differences  across
countries affect  firm performance and  corporate  governance decisions,  and  affect  the
likelihood of the bankruptcy system being used to deal with financial distress.  Rajan and
Zingales (1995) find that contractability is enhanced by legal systems that protect creditor
rights and punish management and equity holders in the case of financial distress.
The  economic  costs  of  bankruptcy  have  been  studied  in  more  detail  for
bankruptcy  filings in the United States, a debtor-friendly system. 2 Gilson (1989) finds
that after filing for bankruptcy, managers suffer large personal costs and that more than
half of the managers, 52%, are fired.  Gilson and Vetsuypens (1994) find that managers
that survive after a bankruptcy filing receive significantly lower salaries and bonuses; on
aLverage,  managers receive only 35% of their previous gross income.
It is not surprising, therefore, that managers of financially distressed firms in the
United States prefer private restructuring to public bankruptcy filings.  Gilson, John, and
Lang (1990)  study  169 financially distressed firms and  find that  only close to half of
these firms use Chapter 11 proceedings to restructure their distressed debt.  They find that
firms that  settle  out-of-court have more intangible assets, a  larger percentage  of  debt
owed  to  banks,  and  fewer  lenders.  Gilson  (1997),  however,  finds  that  out-of-court
2For  example,  White  (1989, 1993,  1994)  compare  the direct  transaction  costs of bankruptcy  under different
regimes,  a topic  that we do not address  in  this paper.
5restructuring is not necessarily beneficial to the shareholders; firms that resolve financial
distress out-of-court are more likely to remain highly-leveraged and more likely, with a
likelihood of 33%, to experience further financial distress.
Several papers have examined the effect of corporate ownership on the resolution
of financial distress.  Japanese firm-level data have been used to examine the main-bank
system, which implies both an ownership and lending relationship between a bank and a
commercial firm.  Hoshi et al. (1990b) find that a bank relationship improves a firm's
access to capital and promotes corporate investment in a sample of Japanese firms.  In
addition, Hoshi, et al. (1990a) show that bank-affiliated firms can more easily renegotiate
their terms of credit to reduce the costs of financial distress.  Consequently, bank-related
firms  recover  more  quickly  from  financial  distress  than  other  firms,  and  without
necessarily  using  formal  reorganization  or  bankruptcy  procedures.  This  finding  is
explained in Aoki (1990) and Prowse (1992), who describe the involvement of Japanese
banks in management decisions as a form of monitoring and resolution of principal-agent
and information problems between the lender and borrower.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), however, find that although ties to a bank improve
access to capital, they do so at a higher cost; i.e., although bank-controlled firms have
access  to  more  capital,  the benefits  are  offset  by  the  rents  extracted  by  the banks.
Johnson et al. (1998) estimate excess stock market returns for a cross-section of emerging
markets, including the East Asian countries in our sample.  They find that weaknesses in
corporate  governance  - defined as  the  existence  of  strong  links  between  banks  and
corporations  and  non-transparent  cross-holdings  between  corporations  - cause larger
discounts in asset prices.
63.  Data
We use financial and ownership structure variables at the firm level in nine
countries  at the end of 1996. Our primary  data source  is the WorldScope  database,  which
contains information on 49 countries.  We expanded our sample of firms using the
Financial  Times Extel database,  which contains information  on 49 countries. In order to
test the significance  of corporate ownership,  we augmented  these data with ownership
information from the Asian Company Handbook 1999 (1998), the Japan Company
Handbook 1999 (1998), Securities  Exchange of Thailand Company  Handbook, and the
Singapore  Investment  Guide.
The combined sample contains income statement, balance sheet, and corporate
ownership information for 5,928 firms.  We excluded firms in the financial sector
because the accounting  standards  for income and profits for these firms are significantly
different  from those in the other sectors. In addition,  bankruptcy  decisions  for banks are
driven by other factors, such as concerns about the systemic  consequences  of closures.
We also excluded firms for which data required for our empirical tests was missing.
After applying these selection criteria, 4,569 firms were available for our empirical
analysis.
To  identify firms that legally filed for bankruptcy protection, we collected
information from  the  respective stock exchanges.  Since the  legal  definition of
bankruptcy  is not consistent  across  the region,  we used as a minimum  standard  that firms
filed for legal creditor  protection. 3 Table 1 provides  descriptive  statistics  of our sample.
3The  majority of firms in our sample filed for bankruptcy  in the second  half of 1998. In Indonesia,  the
Philippines,  and Thailand,  the Bankruptcy  Code was amended  in August,  January,  and April, respectively.
These bankruptcy  reforms increased  the number of bankruptcy  filings by allowing for Chapter 11-type
7Almost 50% of our observations are firms listed on the Japanese exchange, reflecting the
absolute size of their economy relative to the other countries.  Excluding Japan, however,
we have  about the same number of firms listed for each country, about 300 firms on
average, except for the Philippines (68 firms).  As shown in Table 1, in absolute terms
and  as  a  percentage  of  total  firms,  the  largest  number  of  bankruptcies  occurred  in
Thailand,  Korea,  and  Malaysia; the  smallest number  of bankruptcies  occurred  in  the
Philippines,  Singapore and  Taiwan.  As  reported  in  our  summary  statistics,  middle-
income countries in the region (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand),
which  typify less  developed  financial markets and  business law,  account  for  80%  of
reported bankruptcies.
We use the methodology developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and extended  by
Claessens  et  al.  (1999)  to  study  the  ultimate  ownership  structure  of  East  Asian
corporations.  To distinguish between cash-flow and control rights, we identify various
forms  of  intermediate  ownership  structures,  such  as  cross-holdings,  pyramiding,  and
deviations from one-share-one-vote rules.  For example, suppose that a family owns 11%
of the stock of Firm A, which in turn owns 21% of the stock of Firm B.  In this case, we
contend that the family holds 11% of the control rights of Firm B, which is calculated as
the weakest link in the chain of voting rights.  In contrast, however, we contend that the
family  holds  only  2% of the  cash flow rights  of  Firm  B, which  is  calculated  as the
product of the two ownership stakes along the chain.
reorganization  and establishing  independent  bankruptcy  courts.  In Indonesia,  for example,  there were only
11 bankruptcy  filings between 1978 and August 1998,  and 24 filings in the last three months of 1998.
Similarly, in the Philippines,  there were only 35 bankruptcy  filings between 1982 and  1996, and 52
bankruptcy  filings in 1997  and 1998. In contrast,  the large increase  in the number  of bankruptcy  filings in
1998 in Hong Kong, Japan,  Korea,  Singapore,  and Taiwan,  was caused by the increase  in overall  financial
distress  and not because  of improvements  to the bankruptcy  system.
8We further distinguish between firms with ultimate owners versus firms that are
widely held.  Consistent with the methodology used by La Porta et al. (1999), we define
ultimate ownership as ownership of 20% or more of outstanding shares.  Ultimate owners
are further divided into four categories: families, banks, commercial firms, and the state. 4
Furthermore, we identify the "genealogy" of each firm, such as the ownership structure
of each firm's ultimate owner.  Consequently, we identify as bank-related any firm that is
owned by a bank or belongs to a family group that also has ultimate ownership of a bank.
Our results  are reported in the last two columns of Table  1.  We find that the
principal shareholders in the majority of East Asian firms are other commercial firms,
not-for-profit  foundations,  and  financial  institutions.  Corporate  ownership  structures
differ, however, greatly across East Asian countries.  Almost 60% of the Japanese firms
in our sample are bank-related, while only 9% of Taiwanese firms, and 14% of Korean
and Singaporean firms have a bank relationship.  Ownership by families is dominant in
Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand, where 69%, 72%, and 64% of firms are family-
controlled, respectively.  In comparison, only 14% of Japanese firms are controlled by a
family.
Table 2 shows the median values of financial variables and ratios for firms in our
nine countries. 5 We find that prior to the crisis, firms in high-income countries were on
average about three times larger than firms in middle-income countries, as measured by
total assets and sales. 6 Japanese firms are the largest in our sample, with the median firm
having annual  sales  and assets of half a billion  dollars, US$488  and US$457  million
4 We do not distinguish  among  individual  family  members  and use  the family  group as a unit of analysis.
s "High-Income"  is the weighted  average  of Hong Kong,  Japan, Singapore  and Taiwan.
"Middle-Income"  is the weighted  average  of Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  and Thailand.
6 Levels  are converted  to end-of-year  1996  US-dollars.
9respectively.  Thailand has the smallest firms on average, with US$84 and US$51 million
in sales and assets, respectively.
The debt-equity mix and the maturity structure of debt also vary significantly by
country.  In  Korea,  Japan,  and Thailand, debt was  on average  70%  of  corporations'
capital structures in 1996, while in Taiwan it was only 42%].  Short-term debt was 68%
of total debt in Malaysia, but only 45% in the Philippines.  These differences affect the
relationship between firms and their creditors, and influence the severity and resolution
of financial distress.  Furthermore, firms in middle-income countries have lower sales-to-
debt ratios and higher leverage rates, suggesting that firms in these countries were both
smaller and riskier.  For example, in 1996 the median firm in Thailand had a sales-to-debt
ratio  of only  1.52 and  a leverage ratio  of  0.42.  In  comparison, the median  firm  in
Singapore, a high-income country, had a sales-to-debt ratio of 3.05 and a leverage ratio of
0.20.
Firms  in  middle-income  countries,  however,  generally-had  higher  operating
margin  to  sales  ratios  and  higher  (pseudo-)  Tobin's  Q,  suggesting  better  growth
opportunities  in  these  countries.  Indeed,  higher  growth  rates  may  have  led  to  the
relatively higher use of debt in the middle-income countries.  The last column in Table 2
reports the growth in  1998 GDP.  Middle-income countries were  hit the hardest, with
Indonesia and Thailand experiencing a  15% and 8% decline, respectively.  Taiwan was
the only country that registered high growth, 4.9 percent, in 1998.
Table 3 provides comparative information on bankruptcy law, creditor rights, and
the efficacy of the judicial system for the nine East Asian countries in our sample.  The
7For  Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and Singapore  debt was 61%,  65%, 52%,  56%, and
51% of capital,  respectively  (Claessens  et el., 1998).
10information  is  compiled  from  detailed  survey  reports  prepared  for  the  Asian
Development Bank.  The surveys use similar methodology and were conducted by teams
of  legal  experts  in  each  country  and  reviewed  by  a  regional  team  to  ensure  the
comparability of results (Asian Development Bank, 1999).
Creditor rights are strongest in countries with Anglo-Saxon and Germnanic  codes
and weakest in countries with French codes.  For example, creditors in the Philippines,
where the code is of French origin, are barred by the "automatic stay" on assets from
taking any collection action against the debtor's assets.  In addition, a creditor's  security
interest does not guarantee priority status.  Furthermore, the statutory bankruptcy scheme
prohibits creditors from ousting management during reorganization.  In contrast, creditors
in Malaysia, where the code is of Anglo-Saxon origin, have strong creditor rights.
We use the information presented in Table 3 to construct quantitative indices of
creditor protection and the efficacy of the judicial system.  Our results are shown in Table
4, where a higher index indicates better creditor rights and judicial efficiency.  We find
that  Indonesia and  the  Philippines have the  weakest  creditor  protection, while  Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have the strongest creditor protection.  In addition, we find
that  Indonesia, the  Philippines,  and  Taiwan  have the  weakest judicial  system,  while
Korea and Singapore have the strongest judicial systems.
To construct our index of creditor rights, we use the methodology in La Porta et
al. (1997).  This index is an average of four indicators of creditor strengths reported in
columns 3 to  6 of Table  3.  First, the timeliness of rendering  a judgement whether to
liquidate or restructure  once a  bankruptcy petition has  been filed.  For  example, the
bankruptcy codes  in Indonesia, the Philippines,  and Thailand do not  have a  specified
11timetable for rendering a judgement.8 The remaining six countries impose a timetable,
such as 60 working days in Hong Kong and Japan and  180 working days in Malaysia.
Second, whether the incumbent management remains in control of the company during
reorganization  or bankruptcy.  This is the case only in Indonesia and the  Philippines.
Third, whether the creditor is barred by the "automatic stay" from taking collection action
against the debtor's assets during the bankruptcy proceedings.  This is the case only in
Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.  Fourth, whether secured creditors have the first
priority of claims to the debtor's  assets.  This is the case in Hong Kong, Japan,  Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan.
In addition, we use columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 to construct an index of the efficacy
of the judicial  system, shown in Table 4, which report the expense, difficulty, efficiency,
and speed of liquidating or restructuring an insolvent corporate borrower.  For example,
Singapore  has  the  highest  ranking,  7,  which  is  an  average  of  the  liquidation  and
restructuring processes, which are both not expensive, easy, efficient, and quick.  We use
the two indices of creditor rights  and judicial  efficiency to  test the effect  of the  legal
environment on the likelihood of bankruptcy as a means of resolving financial distress.
4.  Empirical Results
Table  5 provides  descriptive statistics for our independent variables. 9 Panel A
shows summary statistics for all firms in our sample.  Panel B shows summary statistics
for firms that filed for bankruptcy and Panel C shows summary statistics for firms that
did not file.  Previous literature, such as Barclay and Smith (1995), found that age and
8  Indonesia,  we refer to the law  before  the bankruptcy  reform  in August 1998.
9 Our choice of explanatory  variables  is consistent  with international  adaptations  of the Altman Z-score,
which  estimates  a model  to predict  corporate  bankruptcy. See Altman  (1984)  for a survey.
12size significantly affect a firm's ability to obtain external financing as the probability of a
firm's failure decreases with age and increases with size.  Our summary statistics for the
three samples finds, for example, that total sales for firms that did not file versus firms
that  filed  is  $19.909 million and  $1.668 million, respectively.  The age  of the  firm,
however, matters  less: Firms that survived bankruptcy are listed, on average, only  one
year longer than firms that filed for bankruptcy.  This is not surprising, since the financial
markets in East Asia are relatively new, and, therefore, all listed firms listed are relatively
young.
Liquidity ratios are used to measure the exposure of firms to external shocks.  For
example, the  ratio  of sales-to-debt  (SALDEBT) provides  an  indication  of the  firm's
ability to  pay  its  liabilities with  generated income.  This  measure  should  reflect  the
sensitivity of the firmn's  solvency to currency and interest shocks.  Indeed, we find that
firms that filed for bankruptcy had lower sales-to-debt ratios so that even small decreases
in sales may have prevented them from making their debt payments.  This suggests that
firms with higher levels of external debt are more sensitive to shocks and are more likely
to require judicial creditor protection.
To measure firms'  efficiency prior to the crisis, we look the operating  margin,
defined  as sales minus  cost  of good sold as  a ratio  of sales  (OISAL).  We find  that
median operating margins are higher for firms that did not file relative to firms that did
file.  This is consistent with our expectations that firms that filed for bankruptcy were ex-
ante more inefficient and financially distressed than firms that survived.
Previous  literature,  such as  Opler  et al. (1997),  found  that  a  firm's  corporate
financing  decisions  depend  on  various  measures  of  the  borrower's  future  growth
13opportunities. We use a (pseudo-) Tobin's Q (TOBINQ),  which is a measure of the
market's assessment of a firm's  investment opportunities,  to  determine the market's
perception  of future growth.' 0 We find that firms that filed for bankruptcy  had lower
(pseudo-) Tobin's Q, which may have effected their inability to access credit during
financial  distress  and increased  their likelihood  of entering  bankruptcy.
We also include two dummies  to account  for differences  in corporate  ownership.
FAMILY  is equal to 1 (0 otherwise)  if the firm is a member  of a family  of firms. BANK
is equal to 1 (0 otherwise)  if the firm is directly  owned by a bank or belong to a family
that also owns a bank."  Only 10%  of the bankrupt  firms are owned  by banks or owned
by a group that also owns  a bank,  compared  to 40% of the firms which  do not file. Bank-
related  firms  thus appear  significantly  less likely  to file for bankruptcy.
In addition to  firm-specific variables, we include country-specific  indicators.
These measures allow us  to  test  the  effect of  variations in  institutional features,
macroeconomic performance, and judicial  efficacy on  the  likelihood of  filing for
bankruptcy.  We  include country dummies to  identify differences in  institutional
characteristics. We use the growth of GNP in 1998 as an ex-post measure of economic
activity and degree of general financial distress in each country following the crisis.
Furthermore,  we use our index of creditor  rights  to study the influence  of legal protection
on the decision  to file. Alternatively,  we use dummies  to identify  the legal-origin  in each
country, as in La Porta et al. (1998).  Finally, we use the interaction term between
10  Tobin's Q is approximated  by the book value of debt plus the market  value of equity divided  by total
assets.
11  This is an improvement  on previous  literature  that examined  bank-related  firms in Japan that only took
account  of direct  ownership.
14creditor rights and judicial efficiency to test if the ability of the judicial system to enforce
creditor rights affects the decision to use the legal system to resolve financial distress.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the Logit regressions.  Table 6 shows that firms
that filed for bankruptcy were more exposed to short-term liquidity constraints and had
lower expected market growth.  This suggests that firms that filed for bankruptcy were
ex-ante riskier than firms that survived.'2
We  also  find  that  firm ownership  structures, in  particular  links  to  banks  and
ownership by families, matter.  Specifically, we find that bank-affiliated firms and firms
with a family-relationship are less likely to file for bankruptcy.  The implied elasticities
of the coefficients in Table 6, column 1, suggest that family-controlled firms are 30% less
likely to  file for bankruptcy than non-family-related firms,  correcting for their  capital
structure and country of origin.  In addition, bank-related firms are 10% less likely to file
for bankruptcy than firms without ownership ties to a bank.  The importance of bank and
family connections suggests that filings are not based solely on market-principles, since a
priori there  is no  economic reason to expect that certain types  of ownership are more
likely to avoid bankruptcy.  The significance of corporate ownership introduces evidence
that ownership ties to  a creditor increases the likelihood of renegotiations  and  out-of-
court settlements and decreases the likelihood of bankruptcy.
In the first regression shown in Table 6, the country dummies for Thailand and
Korea are significant.  This does not explain, however, whether this is due to variation in
market features or macroeconomic conditions.  Therefore, the second regression in Table
6 tests the effect of the real growth rate of GNP in 1998.  This result shows that slower
12  In addition,  we include dummies identifying  2 digit SIC codes, which are not significant and are not
reported.
15growth rates of GNP significantly increase the number of bankruptcies.  Since Japanese
firns  comprise  almost  50% of the  observations in  our  sample,  we  include  the third
column, which  excludes Japanese firms from the sample, to verify that the results  are
robust to the exclusion of Japanese firms.
However, negative macroeconomic shocks do not fully explain the variation in
bankruptcies, since the Asian crisis affected the entire region.  We therefore extend our
tests  to include variables to  capture differences in creditor rights  and judicial  efficacy.
Table 7 shows that we continue to find that financial strength, growth of GNP, and family
and bank relationships are negatively related to the likelihood of filings.  In addition, the
first  regression  in  Table  7  shows that  legal  origins  matter:  firms  in  German-origin
systems, which are have stronger rights and are more creditor-friendly, are more likely to
file for bankruptcy, while firms in countries with French-origin systems, which are more
debtor-friendly, are less  likely to file for bankruptcy.  This  result supports the results
found in previous literature that German- (and English-) origin systems permit creditors
to force delinquent debtors into bankruptcy.
The second regression in Table 7 reports a positive relationship between our index
of the efficiency of the judicial  system and the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.  The
implied elasticity of the coefficient of judicial efficiency suggests that the probability of
filing for bankruptcy increases by 11% for every one-point increase in judicial efficiency.
In other words, if the judicial system in the Philippines were to achieve the same level of
efficiency as in Singapore, bankruptcy filings would increase by 55%.  Similarly, if the
judicial  system  in  Indonesia were  to  achieve the  level  of  efficiency  in  Hong  Kong,
bankruptcy filings would increase by more than 20%.  The third regression in Table 7
16shows a positive relationship between an index of creditor rights and an index of judicial
efficacy.  These results imply that effective contractability strengthened with a credible
threat  of  bankruptcy  enforcement  increases  the  likelihood  of  filings  for  in  court
bankruptcy.  We  suggest that  creditors  are  more  likely  to  force  a  firm  to  file  for
bankruptcy and incur the related legal costs if ex-ante loan features and ex-post judicial
efficacy indicate a recovery of losses.
The differences between Table 6 and Table 7 suggest that it is not only country-
specific  institutional  differences  that  explain  patterns  in  bankruptcy  filings,  but  also
variations in legal origin, efficiency of the judicial  system, and creditor rights.  Judicial
reform  can  increase  the  degree  to  which  the  bankruptcy  system  is  used  to  resolve
financial distress.  Whether increased use of bankruptcy is an ex-ante as well as ex-post
efficient mechanism cannot, however, be answered from these results alone.
6.  Conclusion
There  has  been much  debate  among policy-makers  and  academics  about  the
benefits and dangers of bank and family ownership of commercial firms.13 Our evidence
for  East  Asia  suggests that  family-  and  bank-relationships  provide  insurance  against
likelihood  of  bankruptcy  during  bad  times,  possibly  at  the  expense  of  minority
shareholders.  In addition to firm-specific financial risk, we find that the combination of
better contractability  and judicial  efficacy increase the likelihood of bankruptcy filing.
This suggests that creditors are more likely to force a firm to file for bankruptcy, with its
13 In his February 11th, 1999 speech  in front of the House Banking  Committee  Federal  Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan  indicated  that "the Asian crisis last year highlighted  some of the risks that can arise if
relationships  between  banks and commercial  fimns  are too close."  For a discussion  on the costs  and benefits
of universal  banking, see Saunders and Walter, Eds. (1996).
17related legal costs, if ex-ante loan features and ex-post judicial efficiency indicate a likely
recovery of losses.
Whether the  increased use of  bankruptcy is an  efficient resolution mechanism
cannot be answered from these results alone.  Rather, we would need to investigate the
ex-ante performance of corporations and measure the dead-weight losses associated with
the  resolution  of  financial  distress  through  in-court  bankruptcy.  This  direction  of
research, however, is not feasible until information becomes available on the resolution
of the bankruptcies of financially distressed firms.  14
14  The East Asian crisis is too recent to systematically  analyze  the resolution  of bankruptcy  proceedings.
We can, however, broadly categorize the resolution outcomes  for four of the sample countries. Of all
privately-held  or publicly-traded  firms  which filed for bankruptcy  during 1997  or 1998,  the cases resulted
in the following  decisions,  where  the numbers  for Taiwan  include  small-size  fimns:
Country  Liquidated  Reorganized  Dismissed  Unresolved
Indonesia  2  3  20  27
Philippines  4  4  7  9
Taiwan  317  24  38  33
Thailand  7  9  14  48
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21Table 1: Summary Statistics on Bankruptcy Filings
Middle Income is the average of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.
High Income is the average of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Country  Number  of  % Total  Number  of  % Total  % Linked  % Owned
Observations  Observations  Bankruptcies  Bankruptcies  to Banks  by Families
Hong  Kong  379  8.30%  7  7%  18%  69%
Indonesia  203  4.44%  4  4%  20%  72%
Japan  2243  49.09%  12  1%  59%  14%
Korea  278  6.08%  27  25%  14%  53%
Malaysia  615  13.46%  21  20%  23%  54%
Philippines  68  1.49%  1  1%  37%  43%
Singapore  222  4.86%  1  1%  14%  43%
Taiwan  203  4.44%  1  1%  9%  43%
Thailand  358  7.84%  32  30%  26%  64%
Middle  Income  1,522  33%  85  80%  22%  58%
High Income  3,047  67%  21  20%  47%  25%
East  Asia Nine  4,569  106Table  2: Summary  Statistics  of Financial  Variables
(Medians)
SALES and ASSETS are measured in US$1,000, using the average exchange rate for  1996.
SALDEBT  is the ratio of total sales to total debt. LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
OISAL is the ratio of operating  income (sales less cost of goods sold) and total sales.  TOBINQ
is the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity to total
assets.  GDPG98  is the growth rate of GDP in 1998.  Middle  Income is the weighted average of
Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  Philippines,  and Thailand.  High Income is the weighted average of
Hong Kong,  Japan, Singapore,  and Taiwan.
Country  Sales  Assets  SALDEBT LEV  OISAL  TOBINQ  GDPG98
Hong Kong  237,914.16  134,814.35  2.28  0.21  19.2  1.08  -5.00%
Indonesia  100,361.47  62,088.03  2.17  0.34  34.5  1.09  -15.30%
Japan  488,076.41  457,648.12  3.48  0.27  25.5  1.05  -2.80%
Korea  504,607.88  405,760.37  1.98  0.42  23.2  0.58  -7.00%
Malaysia  63,853.17  44,563.89  2.61  0.22  20.5  1.92  -7.50%
Philippines  149,003.49  71,737.39  2.26  0.19  30.4  1.51  0.20%
Singapore  174,382.75  92,005.63  3.05  0.20  18.7  1.49  0.70%
Taiwan  292,436.36  184,581.82  2.81  0.25  25.4  1.69  4.90%
Thailand  83,980.23  50,760.47  1.52  0.42  28.4  1.05  -8.00%
Middle  Income  132,007.88  97,569.53  1.52  0.63  17.30  0.97  -4.79%
HighIncome  421,070.73  372,659.94  2.16  0.32  25.7  1.34  -2.31%
23Table 3: Main Features  of the Bankruptcy  Codes in East Asia
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Country  Code Dates Back  to  Timetable  To Render a  Management Stay in Automatic Stay  Priority of Secured  Process of  Process of
Judgement  Bankruptcy  Creditors  Liquidation  Restructuring
Hong Kong The 1929  U.K.  60 working days after a  No  No  Paid first  Very Expensive, Expensive, Easy,
bankruptcy  legislation.  petition is registered.  Difficult,  Efficient, Quick
The law was amended in  Efficient, Slow
1985  based on the
revisions  in the U.K.
law.  Another amendment
in 1996 allowed  out-of-
court settlements.
Indonesia  Dutch colonial  No timetable under old  Yes, old code;  Yes, old code; Costs of proceedings Not Expensive,  Expensive,
ordinances  promulgated code;  No, safer August  No after Aug  are paid first,  Difficult,  Difficult,
in 1906.  Amended  in  1998.  1998  followed by claims  Inefficient, Slow Inefficient,  Very
August 1998  to establish 30 working days from  on wages and secured  Slow
a special  commercial  the creditor's petition  creditors.
court.  after August 1998.
Japan  1952  and is loosely  60 working  days  No  Yes  Paid first  Expensive,  Easy,  Expensive,
based  on Chapter 11 in  Efficient, Quick Difficult,
the U.S. Bankruptcy  Efficient, Slow
Law.
Korea  1984  and is based on the 120  working days  No  No  Paid first  Not Expensive,  Expensive,
1978  U.S. Bankruptcy  Easy, Efficient,  Difficult,
Code.  It also has  Quick  Efficient, Quick
provisions  for mediation
for settling debts without
initiating  the full
bankruptcy  process.
Malaysia  The 1985  British  180  working days  No  No  Paid first  Expensive,  Easy, Expensive,
bankruptcy  law.  Efficient, Slow  Difficult,
Efficient, SlowTable 3:  Main Features  of the Bankruptcy Codes in East Asia
(continued)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Country  Code Dates Back to  Timetable  To Render a  Management Stay in Automatic Stay  Priority of Secured  Process of  Process of
Judgement  Bankruptcy  Creditors  Liquidation  Restructuring
Philippines 1909,  with the  No timetable in place.  Yes  Yes  Taxes are paid first,  Not Expensive,  Expensive,  Very
responsibility  taken by  followed  by wages,  Very Difficult,  Difficult,
the courts.  Amended  in  cost of proceedings,  Inefficient, Very Inefficient, Slow
1976  to permit debtors to  and secured  creditors. Slow
petition the SEC for
protection.
Singapore  1965  and based on the  90 working days  No  No  Paid first  Not Expensive,  Not Expensive,
Australian  law of 1961.  Easy, Efficient,  Easy, Efficient,
Amended  in 1987  to  Quick  Quick
include a formal court
supervised  rescue
scheme.  Further
amendments  in 1995.
Taiwan  The law drafted  by the  90 working  days  No  No  Paid first  Not Expensive,  Expensive,
Kuomintang  government  Difficult,  Difficult,
in 1935,  and amended  in  Inefficient, Slow Inefficient, Slow
1989  and 1993.  As in
Korea, is also  has a
mediation  option for out-
of-court settlement
Thailand  Bankruptcy  Act is part ofNo timetable in place.  No  No  Cost of proceedings  Not Expensive,  Not Expensive,
the Commercial  Code,  are paid first,  Easy, Efficient,  Difficult,
developed  in 1940  and  followed  by taxes,  Slow  Efficient, Quick
revised in 1998.  wage claims, and
secured  creditors.
Source: World Bank, Asian Development Bank (1999).
25Table 4: Legal Origin, Creditor Rights, and
Efficacy of the Judicial System
Country  Legal Origin  Creditor Rights  Judicial Efficacy
Hong Kong  Anglo-Saxon  4  6.5
Indonesia  French  0  4.5
Japan  Germanic  3  6.5
Korea  Germanic  3  7.5
Malaysia  Anglo-Saxon  3  5.5
Philippines  French  0  3.0
Singapore  Anglo-Saxon  4  8.0
Taiwan  Germanic  4  4.5
Thailand  Anglo-Saxon  2  6.5
Sources:  Legal Origin is taken from  La Porta et al (1997).  Creditor  Rights  and Efficacy  of Judicial  System
are constructed  by the authors  based on data from  Asian  Development  Bank  (1999) and  reported  in Table
3.
The Creditor  Rights  index is the summation  of four dummy variables,  where the highest possible  score is
4:  TIME, equal to  1 if the timetable for rendering a judgement is less than 90  days, 0 otherwise.
MANAGER,  equal to I if incumbent  management  does not stay during a restructuring  or bankruptcy,  0
otherwise.  STAY,  equal to 1 if there is no Automatic  Stay  on assets, 0 otherwise. CREDITOR,  equal to 1
if secured  creditors  have the highest  priority  in  payment  0 otherwise.
The Judicial  Efficiency  index is the average of 8 variables,  the ranking  (0-2) of expense,  ease, efficiency,
and speed for RESTRUCTURING  and LIQUIDATION.  For Example,  we assign  0 points if Restructuring
is Very Slow, 1 if Slow, 2 if Quick.  Similar ranking  is constructed  for expense,  easy and efficiency. The
maximum  score  is 8 for each Restructuring  and Liquidation.  We take the average  of those scores.Table 5:  Comparison between Survivors and Bankrupt Firms
BANKRUPTCIES  includes  all firms that filed for bankruptcy  / creditor  protection  after  the Asian
crisis.  SURVIVORS  includes all firms that did not file for bankruptcy. The variables are as
follows: AGE is the number of years publicly traded.  Log(SALES)  is the log of total sales,
measured  in US$1,000. SALDEBT  is the ratio of total sales to total debt. OISAL is the ratio of
operating  income (sales less cost of goods  sold) and sales. TOBINQ  is the ratio of the sum of the
book value of debt and the market value of value to  total assets.  FAMILY is a  dummy
identifying firms that are owned by a family.  BANK is a dummy identifying firms that are
owvned  by a bank or by a family that also owns a bank.
Explanatory  Variables  # Obs  Median  Mean  Std. Dev.
Full Sample
Years Listed  4,569  8.00  7.51  2.02
Log(SALES)  4,569  12.26  1.75  12.30
SALDEBT  4.298  2.82  37.07  50.58
OISAL  3,992  0.26  0.86  0.47
TOBINQ  4,088  1.35  1.61  1.52
FAMILY  4,399  n.a.  0.35  0.48
BANK  4,399  n.a.  0.40  0.49
Bankruptcies
Years Listed  106  7.00  7.49  2.36
Log(SALES)  106  11.48  1.57  11.65
SALDEBT  105  1.08  2.92  11.51
OISAL  98  0.49  0.82  0.77
TOBINQ  95  1.24  1.44  0.66
FAMILY  105  n.a.  0.43  0.50
BANK  105  n.a.  0.10  0.29
Survivors
Years Listed  4,463  8.00  7.52  2.01
Log(SALES)  4,463  12.26  1.75  12.31
SALDEBT  4,193  2.88  37.93  51.84
OISAL  3,894  0.26  0.86  0.46
TOBINQ  3,993  1.35  1.62  1.53
FAMILY  4,268  n.a.  0.35  0.48
BANK  4,268  n.a.  0.40  0.49
27Table 6:  Effect of Firm and Country Characteristics on Bankruptcy
(Logit Estimation)
The table is based  on the following  equation  (with modifications  for columns  1-3)
Bankruptcy =Intercept +,8I LISTING+  ,3 2LSALES+  / 3SALDEBT  + 84 OISAL+
/35  TOBINQ  +  /6  FAILY+  /37 BANK  +  /8  GNPG98  +
/89  DUM-Hi  +81013  [DUM-THA,  DUM-KOR,  DUM-IDN,  DUM-MYS]
The dependent  variable BANKRUPTCY  identifies  firms that legally  filed for creditor protection
in  1997 or  1998 (1=Bankruptcy,  0=Survivors).  The independent  variables are as follows:
LISTING is the number of years publicly traded.  LSALES is log of total sales, measured in
US$1,000. SALDEBT  is the ratio of total sales to total debt.  OISAL is the ratio of operating
income  (sales less cost of goods sold)  to sales. TOBINQ  is the ratio of the sum of the book value
of debt and the market value of equity  to total assets. FAMILY  is a dummy  identifying  firms that
are owned by a family. BANK is a dummy identifying  firms that are owned by a bank or by a
family that also owns a bank. DUM-Hi is a dummy indicating  the developed countries (Hong
Kong, Japan, Singapore,  and Taiwan). DUM-THA  is a dummy  indicating  Thailand. DUM-KOR
is a dummy indicating  Korea.  DUM-IDN is a dummy indicating  Indonesia. DUM-MYS is a
dummy indicating Malaysia. GGNP98  is the real growth rate in  1998.  *  and **  indicate
significance  at the 5% and 1% level,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3) Without  Japan
Independent  Variables  Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics
Firm  Specific
lNTERCEPT  0.19  0.14  -0.46  -0.44  -0.58  -0.54
LISTING  -0.07  -1.20  -0.06  -1.07  -0.05  -0.89
LSALES  -0.15  -1.78  -0.13  -1.75  -0.10  -1.16
SALDEBT  -0.20**  -3.34  -0.26**  -4.01  -0.17**  -3.02
OISAL  -0.44  -0.97  0.54**  2.58  0.44**  2.04
TOBINQ  -0.61*  -2.43  -0.49**  -2.10  -0.44  -1.96
FAMILY  -1.40**  -3.60  -1.68**  -4.38  -1.49**  -2.84
BANK  -0.56*  -2.31  -0.58*  -2.40  -0.83**  -3.29
Country  Specific
GNPG98  -0.13**  -4.36  -0.10**  -3.37
DUM-Hi  -0.34  -0.32
DUM-Thailand  2.75*  2.24
DUM-Indonesia  0.86  0.66
DUM-Korea  2.18*  2.01
DUM-Malaysia  1.41  1.32
Number  of observations:  3,348  3,348  1,378
% Concordant:  85.7%  84.6%  84.4%
28Table 7:  Effect of Legal Origin  and Judicial  System
(Logit Estimation)
The table is based on the following  equation  (with modifications  for columns 1-3):
Bankruptcy = Intercept  +/31  LISTING+,8 2LSALES+,B 3SALDEBT+/34  OISAL  +
,85  TOBINQ +  6 FAILY  +  7  BANK  +  /38  GNP98 +
/3A  FRENCH  +A/3o  GERMAN  +  fill  JAPAN  + ,B, JUD +fll3  CREDIT-JUD
The dependent  variable BANKRUPTCY  identifies  firms that legally filed for creditor protection
in  1997 or  1998 (l=Bankruptcy, O=Survivors). The independent variables are as follows:
LISTING is the number of years publicly traded.  LSALES is log total sales, measured in
US$1,000. SALDEBT  is the ratio of total sales to total debt.  OISAL is the ratio of operating
income (sales less cost of goods sold) and sales.  TOBINQ  is the ratio of the sum of the book
value of debt and the market value of equity to total assets.  FAMILY  is a dummy identifying
firms that are owned  by a family. BANK is a dummy  identifying  firms that are owned by a bank
or by a family that also owns a bank. GDPG98  is the real growth rate in 1998. FRENCH is a
dummy indicating French legal origin (Indonesia,  and Philippines).  GERMAN is a dummy
indicating  German legal origin (Japan,  Korea, and Taiwan). JAPAN is a dummy  for Japan. JUD
is an index of the efficiency  of the  judicial system.  CREDIT-JUD  is the interaction  of JUD and an
index  of creditor rights. * and ** indicate  significance  at the 5% and 1% level,  respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)
Independent  Variables  Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics
Firm Specific
INTERCEPT  -0.94  -0.82  -3.32*  2.59  -1.89  -1.54
LISTING  -0.05  -0.90  -0.04  0.73  -0.02  -0.40
LSALES  -0.18*  -2.02  -0.14  1.78  -0.10  -1.32
SALDEBT  -0.21**  -3.47  -0.22*  3.65  -0.23**  -3.70
OISAL  0.35  1.67  0.27  -1.27  0.50*  2.17
TOBINQ  -0.37  -1.73  -0.25  1.21  -0.32  -1.48
FAMILY  -1.39**  -3.53  -1.40**  3.57  -1.41**  -3.58
BANK  -0.59**  -2.46  -0.67**  2.81  -0.70**  -2.94
Country  Specific
GNPG98  -0.27**  -3.71  -0.13**  2.76  -0.14**  -3.01
FRENCH  -2.66**  -3.14
GERMAN  0.87*  2.22
JAPAN  -1.15*  -2.32  -1.14**  -3.27  -1.02*  -2.41
JUD  0.54**  2.75
CREDIT-JUD  0.05*  2.02
Number of observations:  3,348  3,348  3,348
% Concordant:  85.7%  84.6%  84.4%
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